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INTRODUCTION
Cars crash. So too will autonomous vehicles, a new
generation of vehicles under development that are capable of
operating on roadways without direct human control.1 A
critical factor with respect to the feasibility of such vehicles is
how often and with what severity such crashes will occur. If
autonomous vehicles have statistically more, or more severe,
accidents than standard cars, then such vehicles will not be
legally viable for widespread use. Judges and juries will
* Gary E. Marchant is a Regents’ Professor, a Lincoln Professor of
Emerging Technologies, a Law & Ethics Professor, and the Faculty Director of
the Center for Law, Science & Innovation at the Sandra Day O’Connor College
of Law, Arizona State University.
** Rachel A. Lindor is a graduate of the Sandra Day O’Connor College of
Law at Arizona State University, Research Director of the Center for Law,
Science & Innovation at the College of Law, and is currently completing her
M.D. at the Mayo Medical School.
1. See generally Matthew Michaels Moore & Beverly Lu, Autonomous
Vehicles for Personal Transport: A Technology Assessment, (Social Science
Research Network, Working Paper, 2011), available at http://www.pickar.
caltech.edu/e103/Final%20Exams/Autonomous%20Vehicles%20for%20Personal
%20Transport.pdf.
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likely treat a vehicle manufacturer who has substituted a
riskier autonomous vehicle for a safer conventional vehicle
harshly.
On the other hand, if autonomous vehicles reduce the
frequency and/or severity of accidents, liability will still be an
important and potentially limiting consideration for
manufacturers. Liability, in that case, requires an analysis of
three key factors. First, who will be liable? Second, what
weight will the court’s finder of fact give to the overall
comparative safety of autonomous vehicles when determining
whether those involved in a crash should be held liable?
Third, will a vehicle “defect” that creates potential
manufacturer liability be found in a higher percentage of
crashes than with conventional vehicle crashes where driver
error is usually attributed to be the cause? Depending on the
answers to these questions, liability has the potential to
present a significant deterrent to the development of
autonomous vehicles, even though such vehicles would
provide an overall safety benefit relevant to today’s drivercontrolled cars.
This Article assesses the potential interactions between
legal liability and autonomous vehicles. It begins in Section I
with a discussion of the relevant liability doctrine and
precedents from other technologies that may indicate how
judges and juries are likely to allocate liability for
autonomous vehicle crashes.2 Section II then examines who
might be held liable for an autonomous vehicle crash.3
Section III assesses the relative risk issues that are likely to
be the key determinants of liability.4 Finally, Section IV
discusses some potential liability protections available to
manufacturers.5
These include the assumption of risk
defense, potential legislative interventions limiting liability,
and federal preemption of state tort claims.
I.

LIABIITY DOCTRINE AND RELEVANT PRECEDENTS

There are two key doctrinal issues in determining tort
liability for personal injury. First is the theory of liability.

2.
3.
4.
5.

See infra notes 6–19 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 20–31 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 32–56 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 57–74 and accompanying text.
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Potential theories of liability include negligence, strict
liability, and breach of implied warranty of merchantability.
In the context of automotive crash injuries, negligence and
strict liability are the two most common theories, usually
raised in the alternative by plaintiffs. A negligence claim
considers the reasonableness of the defendant’s actions,
usually measured in terms of industry standard of care or a
cost-benefit analysis. Strict liability, in contrast, historically
was intended to apply liability to a party that caused the
injury, regardless of fault. Courts, however, have retreated
from applying strict liability in its absolute form, instead
tempering it with some sort of reasonableness consideration
in most applications. To that extent, the standard for strict
liability begins to converge with the standard for negligence,
and thus the two are considered together in the discussion of
defects and liability that follows below.6
The second issue in determining liability is the type of
defect in the product which gives rise to the liability. The
Restatement (Third) of Torts states that product liability
requires that a product must be found to have at least one of
three categories of “defect” before liability can be imposed.7
The first category is a manufacturing defect, where the
product “departs from its intended design even though all
possible care was exercised in the preparation and marketing
of the product.”8 This first category of defect is unlikely to
apply very often to autonomous vehicles, since modern
manufacturing methods, especially for critical components of
autonomous vehicles such as the software and navigation
systems, can be manufactured with low error rates. A second
category of potential defect is a failure to provide adequate
instructions or warnings, which applies “when the foreseeable
risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced
or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or
warnings . . . and the omission of the instructions or warnings
renders the product not reasonably safe.”9 Most jurisdictions
limit this duty to warn of risks that could be “reasonably”
known at the time of sale.
The manufacturer of an
6. The one difference is in manufacturing defects, discussed below, which
does apply a true strict liability standard.
7. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY § 2 (1997).
8. Id. § 2(a).
9. Id. § 2(c).
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autonomous vehicle may, therefore, have a duty to disclose
known risks of failure, including any known or suspected
failure modes. Since the manufacturer of an autonomous
vehicle will seek to engineer out, or at least understand, any
risks involved in the vehicle, system or component failure, the
required warnings should be quite limited. As such, the duty
to disclose those risks should be relatively easily discharged
in most cases.
The third and most significant type of defect for
autonomous vehicles, as with many products, is a design
defect.
The standard for a design defect is that “the
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have
been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable
alternative design . . . and the omission of the alternative
design renders the product not reasonably safe.”10 This is
called the “risk-utility test.”11 An alternative test, called the
“consumer expectation test,”12 inquires what level of safety a
reasonable consumer would expect from the product in
question; yet this test is losing favor in many states, and is
generally considered particularly inapplicable in cases
involving the analysis of technical and scientific
information.13
Autonomous vehicles have not yet been commercially
deployed. Not surprisingly, there has not been any reported
personal injury litigation regarding these products to date.
There are, however, a number of analogous technologies that
have been the subject of litigation. These cases may provide
some useful hints as to how courts and juries are likely to
apply the product liability doctrine to autonomous vehicles.14
Industrial robots, for example, have played a role in a large
number of employee injuries, resulting in the robots’
manufacturers being named in a number of subsequent
lawsuits. Though most incidents appear to be attributed to

10. Id. § 2(b).
11. Aaron D. Twerski & James A. Henderson, Jr., Manufacturers’ Liability
for Defective Product Designs: The Triumph of Risk-Utility, 74 BROOK. L. REV.
1061, 1065 (2009).
12. Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
1700 (2003).
13. E.g., Montag v. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 75 F.3d 1414 (10th Cir. 1996).
14. For additional discussion of such liability, see M. Ryan Calo, Open
Robotics, 70 MD. L. REV. 571, 594–600 (2011).
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the employees’ failures to take proper safety precautions15 or
employees’ decisions to disable available safety features of the
these
cases
highlight
manufacturers’
machines,16
vulnerability to lawsuits in accidents involving their
products.
The dozens of suits brought against car manufacturers
for accidents attributed to the cars’ cruise control systems are
more relevant to autonomous vehicles. Plaintiffs are often
successful in alleging17 that the cruise control systems caused
the cars to unexpectedly accelerate and fail to respond to
braking.18
Finally, airplanes capable of flying on “autopilot” (while
also manned by a live pilot) provide a close analogy to
autonomous vehicles. At least one case involving a collision of
an auto-piloted plane has been litigated. While the plane
that was controlled by autopilot was found to be the cause of
the collision with another plane, the court attributed the
error to the pilot rather than the design of the autopilot
feature of the plane, with the judge opining that, “[t]he
obligation of those in charge of a plane under robot control to
keep a proper and constant lookout is unavoidable.”19
Whether these cases will have any relevance to the courts’
treatment of emerging autonomous vehicle technology is
difficult to predict.

15. See, e.g., Payne v. ABB Flexible Automation, Inc., 116 F.3d 480 (8th Cir.
1997), in which employee was fatally injured by a robot used to construct
automobile wheels after he failed to comply with safety measures requiring him
to “lock out” the robot and to slow the speed of the robot before entering its ‘cell.’
16. See, e.g., Edens v. Bellini, 597 S.E.2d 863 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004), in which
employee was fatally injured by a robotic shuttle used to transport wool, after
the robot’s operator disabled the pressure-sensitive safety mats that signaled
the robot to stop automatically if they were triggered by someone stepping on
them.
17. See, e.g., Cole v. Ford Motor, Co., 900 P.2d 1059 (Or. Ct. App. 1995)
(explaining that the jury awarded $375,000 to plaintiff whose car allegedly
accelerated when the driver pushed the brake pedal, causing the driver to lose
control and crash into a guard rail).
18. See, e.g., Watson v. Ford Motor Co., 699 S.E.2d 169 (S.C. 2010); Ashley
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 666 So.2d 1320 (La. Ct. App. 1996); Lawrence v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 73 F.3d 587 (5th Cir. 1996).
19. Brouse v. U.S., 83 F. Supp. 373, 374 (N.D. Ohio 1949).
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II. WHO WILL BE HELD LIABLE?
In a conventional vehicle crash, the accident is usually
attributable to one of, or a combination of, three primary
possible causes: (i) the driver; (ii) a vehicle malfunction or
defect; and/or (iii) unavoidable natural conditions (weather,
road conditions, animal on the road, etc). Any liability is
usually allocated to one or both of the first two potential
causes—the driver and the vehicle manufacturer. In a multivehicle crash, there may be two or more drivers and vehicle
manufacturers involved, each of which could potentially be at
fault in whole or in part, and therefore, potentially liable.20
Autonomous vehicles are likely to change the dynamics of
who may be held liable. In considering these changes, it is
first necessary to distinguish partial autonomous vehicles
from completely autonomous vehicles.
A partially
autonomous vehicle could involve a range of various safety
systems, such as a warning system that alerts the driver
when the vehicle strays out of its lane or a collision avoidance
systems that slows or stops the vehicle before it contacts
another vehicle or object.21
These partial autonomous
systems will shift some, but not all, of the responsibility for
accident avoidance from the driver to the vehicle, presumably
reducing the risk of accidents (since that is the very purpose
of the system). With a fully autonomous vehicle, however, the
responsibility for avoiding an accident shifts entirely to the
vehicle and the components of its accident avoidance systems.
The liability implications of an accident that results from
a failure of a vehicle’s accident avoidance system will be
similar, regardless of whether the vehicle is partially or fully
autonomous. When the driver has a choice to turn on the
autonomous system and exercised that choice negligently, the
apportionment of responsibility between the car and driver
20. In a study mandated by Congress of 5471 car accidents, the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) found that 30.8% of accidents
involved a single vehicle, 57.2% involved two vehicles, and 12% involved three
or more vehicles. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., DOT HS 811 059 NATIONAL MOTOR
VEHICLE CRASH CAUSATION SURVEY: REPORT TO CONGRESS 17 (2008).
21. See NIDHI KALRA ET AL., LIABILITY AND REGULATION OF AUTONOMOUS
VEHICLE TECHNOLOGIES 3–4 (2009) (California PATH Research Report UCBITS-PRR-2009-28); Sven A. Beiker, Legal Aspects of Autonomous Driving, 52
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1145 (2010) (Report for the Center for Automotive
Research at Stanford (CARS), Stanford University); Moore & Lu, supra note 1,
at 6–8.
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may be more difficult. For example, if the instruction manual
instructed the owner not to use the autonomous vehicle in
certain weather conditions, or on specific types of traffic
patterns, but the owner does so anyway, the driver may be
held at least partially at fault. Similarly, if the driver failed
to utilize, or was negligent in utilizing an available over-ride
mechanism to assume control of the vehicle,22 he or she may
be allocated some or all of the blame for a resulting accident.
In most cases though, especially those involving a dedicated
and totally autonomous vehicle, the driver is unlikely to be a
factor in the liability determination.
Because drivers are found to be at fault in a large
majority of current automobile accidents,23 removing the
driver from the liability equation in autonomous vehicles will
have important implications. Of course, by removing driver
error as a factor, the frequency of accidents should go down,
which is one of the key potential benefits of an autonomous
vehicle in the first place. When an accident does occur
though, the vehicle manufacturer, or some other party
involved in the design, manufacture, or operation of the
autonomous vehicle is likely to be held liable for a higher
proportion of the accidents. This will be more likely to occur
with autonomous vehicles than it currently does with
conventional vehicles.24 In other words, when an autonomous
vehicle does crash, most likely something went wrong with

22. Moore & Lu, supra note 1, at 8 (discussing switchable on-and-off
autonomous control system).
23. In the National Motor Vehicle Crash Causation Survey, NHTSA found
that driver factors was the primary cause of the accident in 5096 of 5471
accidents studied, whereas vehicle problems were the primary cause of 130
accidents, and road conditions or weather conditions were the primary cause of
135 accidents. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 20, at 23–26.
24. D. RANDAL AYERS, VA. TRANSP. RESEARCH COUNCIL, VTRC 94-R6, TORT
REFORM AND “SMART” HIGHWAYS: ARE LIABILITY CONCERNS IMPEDING THE
DEVELOPMENT OF COST-EFFECTIVE INTELLIGENT VEHICLE-HIGHWAY SYSTEMS?
26–27 (1994), available at http://ntl.bts.gov/DOCS/ayers.html. There are two
primary theories by which a vehicle manufacturer can be held liable for a
vehicle accident. The first, and the one most relevant here, is that a “defect” in
a vehicle caused or substantially contributed to the accident. The second
theory, which may not be appreciably different for conventional and
autonomous vehicles, is that deficiencies in the vehicle’s “crashworthiness”
result in greater injuries from an accident than should have resulted. See
Haberkorn v. Chrysler Corp., 533 N.W.2d 373, 379–80 (Mich. App. Ct. 1995)
(holding vehicle manufacturer had the duty to design its product to eliminate
any unreasonable risk of foreseeable injury as a result of a collision).
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the collision avoidance system or the vehicle encountered
conditions that it was not adequately programmed to
address.25 Unlike a conventional vehicle crash, where the
vehicle malfunction involves some sort of defect, such as a tire
blowout or gas tank explosion, the malfunction in an
autonomous vehicle will usually be a programming error or
system failure that could implicate several different
potentially liable parties.26
If an autonomous vehicle malfunctioned and caused an
accident, one or more of several entities could be held liable.27
The list of potential parties includes the vehicle
manufacturer, the manufacturer of a component used in the
autonomous system, the software engineer who programmed
the code for the autonomous operation of the vehicle, and the
road designer in the case of an intelligent road system that
helps control the vehicle.28 The various component parts and
their respective roles in causing a malfunction may be hard to
discern and separate for the purpose of assigning
responsibility.29
In most cases, it will be the vehicle
manufacturer who will, for both practical and doctrinal
reasons, be the party held liable for a crash involving an

25. See Moore & Lu, supra note 1 (discussing that the greatest impediments
to autonomous vehicles is decision-making under conditions of uncertainty and
operating the vehicle safely under unusual weather and environmental
conditions).
26. See Beiker, supra note 21, at 1152 (“As the vehicle navigates itself
through traffic, it makes ‘mission-critical’ decisions, which, in a narrow range of
circumstances, can and will contribute to accidents. Such an event cannot
necessarily be classified as a technical failure, however, the same way as, for
instance, a damaged tire.”).
27. See Mark H. Chignell et al., The Principles of Caveat Vendor, Caveat
Emptor and Caveat Operator in Robotic Safety, 8 J. OCCUPATIONAL ACCIDENTS
79, 83 (1986) (discussing possible liable parties in accident caused by
autonomous system generally).
28. This list assumes that the driver is not liable because it had no direct
control over the functioning of the autonomous vehicle.
29. Wendell Wallach, From Robots to Techno Sapiens: Ethics, Law and
Public Policy in the Development of Robotics and Neurotechnologies, 3 LAW,
INNOVATION & TECH. 185, 194 (2011); Calo, supra note 14, at 597 (“It is
extremely difficult to discover whether software, as opposed to hardware, is
responsible for the glitch that led to an accident.”). An additional complexity is
that a truly autonomous system self-teaches new behaviors based on
experience. Thus, the vehicle may act based on such self-learning to cause an
accident that may have been inconsistent with the initial programming for
which the manufacturer was responsible. See Robert Sparrow, Killer Robots, 24
J. APPLIED PHIL. 62, 70 (2007).
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autonomous vehicle.30 The practical argument is that the
vehicle manufacturer will usually have the “deep pockets”
that the injured plaintiff will seek to target. From a doctrinal
perspective, the vehicle manufacturer, as the party ultimately
responsible for the final product, will be the most likely party
to be found liable. For example, the manufacturer of a
component part is not liable for defects in the final product
over which it had no control, although it is liable if the part
was defective when the component left the manufacturer. A
similar rule is likely to apply to the software engineer.31 So,
unless the component part or software engineer produced a
product that was clearly defective, the vehicle manufacturer
will be the party most likely to be fingered for liability,
although there will likely be cases where other parties are
sued.
One other dynamic that may be different in autonomous
vehicle crashes is the “who is liable” category in the context of
multi-vehicle crashes. In conventional vehicle accidents, an
injured person usually sues the manufacturer of his or her
own vehicle for failing to provide a crashworthy vehicle.
There are scenarios where the first driver’s vehicle
malfunctions and causes the accident, in which the second
driver may sue the manufacturer of the first vehicle for any
injuries incurred as a result of the accident. But those
scenarios tend to be the minority in conventional crash
cases—most of the time an injured driver is suing the
manufacture of his or her own vehicle. In a crash between
two or more vehicles—where at least one vehicle is an
autonomous vehicle, and a malfunction or ill-advised

30. For example, the manufacturer of a component is largely protected from
liability for failure to warn when it is integrated into a sophisticated product.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY § 5 cmt. b (1997)
(“The component seller is required to provide instructions and warnings
regarding risks associated with the use of the component product. . . . However,
when a sophisticated buyer integrates a component into another product, the
component seller owes no duty to warn either the immediate buyer or ultimate
consumers of dangers arising because the component is unsuited for the special
purpose to which the buyer puts it.”).
31. Computer programming is a service rather than a product, and thus the
actions of a computer programmer will be evaluated under a negligence or
malpractice standard rather than under products liability. Frances E. Zollers et
al., No More Soft Landings for Software: Liability for Defects in an Industry
That Has Come of Age, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 745
(2005).
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maneuver by that vehicle allegedly contributed to the
accident—all injured persons in the accident are likely to sue
the manufacturer of the autonomous vehicle.
III. RELATIVE RISK ISSUES
Relative risk issues are likely to be the most important
variables affecting the liability exposure of autonomous
vehicles, and consequently, their economic viability.32 These
relative risk issues apply in several layers. The first layer is
the threshold question of whether autonomous vehicles will
increase or decrease the frequency and severity of vehicle
collisions. One of the key drivers pushing the development of
autonomous vehicles is improved safety. It is therefore
presumed that an autonomous vehicle would be safer than a
conventional vehicle.33 If, to the contrary, an autonomous
vehicle raised net accident risks, it would likely not be viable
for widespread use. A manufacturer that substitutes a
riskier product for a safer product will generally expose itself
to lawsuits and runaway liability.
Thus, absent exceptional circumstances or applications,
autonomous vehicles will only be viable if they are safer than
the conventional vehicles they replace. This follows from the
presumption that safety is one of the primary motivating
objectives of creating autonomous vehicles. As a New York
Times story noted, “[r]obot drivers react faster than humans,
have 360-degree perception and do not get distracted, sleepy
or intoxicated . . . .”34 But even if the autonomous vehicles are
safer overall, compared to conventional vehicles, they will
still be subject to liability when malfunctions or other failures
result in accidents and associated injuries. Most accidents
involving an autonomous vehicle will be the result of the
autonomous system failing, because, as discussed above,
there will not be a driver to blame for the accident.35
32. Relative risk is the ratio of the risk in the population of interest (in this
case autonomous vehicles) divided by the risk in the background or control
population (in this case, conventional non-autonomous vehicles). See Michael D.
Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances
Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 NW. U. L.
REV. 643, 647 (1992).
33. See Moore & Lu, supra note 1, at 3–4.
34. John Markoff, Google Cars Drive Themselves, in Traffic, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 9, 2010, at A1.
35. Of course there will be some accidents involving autonomous vehicles
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There are many examples of products that have a net
safety benefit that are still subject to liability when an injury
results. The litigation against vaccine manufacturers, for
example, clearly illustrates this paradox. The public health
benefit of vaccines is undeniable, yet they are so frequently
the source of lawsuits that federal preemption laws had to be
passed to protect their manufacturers.36 Even with these
protections in place, vaccine manufacturers continue to be
held liable for the rare instances in which their products
cause injuries that do not fall within the protections of the
federal legislation.37 Automobile manufacturers have faced
similar liability threats after incorporating various features
designed to improve the safety of their automobiles, such as
anti-lock braking systems38 and airbags.39 General Motors,
for example, was sued by a woman and her family after the
passenger-side airbags in their vehicle failed to deploy in a
collision with an eighteen-wheeler, resulting in permanent
and severe injuries to the woman.40 Despite the fact that
passenger-side airbags were not required by the National
Highway Transportation Safety Commission at the time, the
jury found the airbags to be defective and awarded the
woman and her family $18.5 million in damages.41
Although the overall safety benefit of autonomous
vehicles will not provide a complete liability shield,
manufacturers of such products may be able to use this safety
benefit in their defense. In many product liability cases, the
manufacturer defends the safety of its product, and the
plaintiffs attack its riskiness—by comparing the product to
that are the fault of the driver of the other vehicle, assuming it is not
autonomous. This also assumes that the vehicle is fully autonomous and the
passenger had no way to override the autonomous system, or that the vehicle
was partially autonomous but the driver was not negligent in his or her failure
to prevent or mitigate the autonomous system’s error.
36. National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1–300aa-34
(1986).
37. See, e.g., Strong v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 261 S.W.3d 493 (Mo. Ct. App.
2007) (upholding a jury’s $8.5 million verdict to a consumer who contracted
paralytic polio from an oral polio vaccine).
38. Baluchinsky v. Gen. Motors Corp., 670 N.Y.S.2d 536 (App. Div. 1998).
39. See, e.g., Morton International v. Gillespie, 39 S.W.3d 651 (Tex. Ct. App.
2001) (affirming trial court’s $950,000 award to a woman who was injured when
the deployment of her airbag was delayed during an accident); Gen. Motors
Corp. v. Burry, 203 S.W.3d 514 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006).
40. See Gen. Motors Corp., 203 S.W.3d 514.
41. Id.
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alternative designs and competing products on the market.
An example is the defense by General Motors (“GM”) of its
C/K pickup in a series of lawsuits in the 1990s.42 Plaintiffs in
these suits alleged that GM’s placement of the gas tank on
the side of the model, outside the vehicle frame, created an
increased risk of fatal fires after side impacts. GM attempted
to defend the safety of its vehicle with comparative analyses,
contending that the overall crashworthiness of its vehicles
was better than most vehicles on the road. GM further
argued that even if its vehicles were prone to a slightly
increased risk of fire fatalities from side impacts on the side
with the gas tank, they had an equivalent or lower rate of
fatalities and fire fatalities from all types of accidents.43
There is an inevitable trade-off in the placement of the gas
tank—putting the gas tank in one location (e.g., side of
vehicle) increases the fire risk from impacts in that region of
the vehicle, but also decreases the risks from impacts in other
regions where the tank could have been located, but was not
(e.g., the rear of vehicle).44 This argument of overall superior
safety was largely ineffective with juries, as they returned
adverse verdicts against GM, including large punitive
damages awards.45
Parties have also attempted to use comparative risk
evidence in all-terrain vehicle (“ATV”) litigation. The courts
generally exclude the defendant from introducing
comparative risk data showing the relative safety of ATVs
compared to other recreational activities, such as riding
snowmobiles and motorcycles, on the basis that such
comparative risk evidence is irrelevant and unduly

42. E.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Moseley, 447 S.E.2d 302 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
See Terence Moran, GM Burns Itself, A M. L AW., Apr. 1993, at 68–83.
43. GENERAL MOTORS, EVALUATION OF THE SAFETY OF GM 1973-87 C/K
PICKUP TRUCKS, PART I: INITIAL RESPONSE OF THE GENERAL MOTORS
CORPORATION TO NHTSA LETTER OF APRIL 9, 1993 (Apr. 30, 1993) (copy on file
with author); Moran, supra note 42, at 69, 78.
44. Walter Olson, The Most Dangerous Vehicle on the Road, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 9, 1993, at A16, available at http://walterolson.com/articles/gmtrucks.html
(“Any possible placement of the fuel tank ‘causes’ some accidents and averts
others. Respectable designers have tried every gas-tank location at one time or
another . . . . All have been rejected at other times as unsafe.”).
45. Moran, supra note 42, at 81; Sam LaManna, GM Verdict Could Affect
Future Cases, NAT’L L.J., May 3, 1993, at 21, 25; GM v. Moseley, 447 S.E.2d
302, 305 (Ga. App. Ct. 1994). Jury awarded $101 million in punitive damages
against GM. Id.
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prejudicial.46 In cases where the plaintiff “opened the door” to
such evidence by introducing reports on the statistical risks of
ATVs, however, the defendant was permitted to introduce its
comparative risk evidence to impeach the plaintiff’s evidence
and to argue against punitive damages.47 Such comparative
risk evidence, when allowed, seems to be effective for the
defendant. Plaintiffs appealed (unsuccessfully) a verdict in
their own favor, in at least one instance, to challenge the
introduction of comparative risk information on rebuttal. The
plaintiffs presumably concluded that the comparative risk
evidence substantially reduced their recovery.48
An autonomous vehicle manufacturer could, therefore,
try to defend its vehicle in court by demonstrating that the
vehicle is safer overall than the conventional vehicles it
replaces. This argument is likely to be unsuccessful when an
accident was caused by a clear defect or malfunction in the
vehicle design, especially if the defect could have been
prevented or fixed by an alternative design. The cost-benefit
(or risk-utility) argument will not depend on whether the atfault autonomous vehicle is better overall than a traditional
vehicle, but whether the autonomous vehicle technology could
have been tweaked to make it safer. In principle, the costbenefit analysis is based on the knowledge that the
manufacturer had when the vehicle was manufactured. In
practice, however, hindsight from the accident that actually
occurred will inevitably provide new insights into how the
technology could have been made safer, which will then be
imputed to the manufacturer. Given the complexity of an
autonomous system, a plaintiff’s expert will almost always be
able to testify (with the benefit of hindsight) that the
manufacturer should have known about and adopted the
alternative, safer design.
The manufacturer cannot possibly anticipate every
possible scenario the vehicle will encounter, especially for a
technology as complex as autonomous driving systems. For

46. Bittner v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 533 N.W.2d 476 (Wisc. 1995)
(overturning verdict for defense based on improper admission of comparative
risk evidence); Kava v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 48 P.3d 1170, 1172 (Alaska 2002)
(upholding exclusion of comparative risk data in defendant’s case-in-chief).
47. Hulmes v. Honda Motor Co., 960 F. Supp. 844, 864 (D.N.J. 1997); Kava,
48 P.3d at 1174.
48. Kava, 48 P.3d at 1173–74.
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the situations it does anticipate, the manufacturer can
usually design the system to minimize the risk of an accident.
The problem is that most accidents will result from situations
that the manufacturer or designer did not anticipate. This
will open the manufacturer to second-guessing by the
plaintiff’s expert that an adjustment would have provided a
safer alternative system that would have avoided the accident
in question.49 The manufacturer will almost always lose the
cost-benefit argument, conducted in hindsight in the
litigation context, when it focuses at the micro-scale between
slightly different versions of the autonomous system. This is
because the cost of not implementing the potential
improvement will usually be severe—the loss of one or more
lives or other serious injury, compared to the relatively small
cost of the marginal improvement that might have prevented
the accident.50 The technology is potentially doomed if there
are a significant number of such cases, because the liability
burden on the manufacturer may be prohibitive of further
development. Thus, even though an autonomous vehicle may
be safer overall than a conventional vehicle, it will shift the
responsibility for accidents, and hence liability, from drivers
to manufacturers. The shift will push the manufacturer away
from the socially-optimal outcome—to develop the
autonomous vehicle.51
One final aspect of relative risk in liability
determinations will be the jurors’ (and to a lesser extent,
judges’) perceptions about autonomous vehicles. Liability
determinations always involve an element of jury emotion
and ethical response.52 It is not clear how juries will respond
to autonomous vehicles, especially with hindsight bias after
the vehicle has been in an accident that has injured the
plaintiff sitting before them. Some jurors may value the
49. If the accident was caused by an aspect of the autonomous vehicle that
could not easily have been foreseen or fixed, and which involved a tradeoff
inherent in moving to the safer autonomous design, the argument against
liability will be much stronger.
50. Of course, from a prospective perspective, there are almost an infinite
number of improvements that could be made to slightly improve safety. In
many cases, these improvements will only appear justified after an accident has
occurred. As is often stated, hindsight is perfect.
51. See KALRA ET AL., supra note 21, at 30.
52. See W. Kip Viscusi, Jurors, Judges, and the Mistreatment of Risk by the
Courts, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 107, 135 (2001); Erica Beecher-Monas, Heuristics,
Biases, and the Importance of Gatekeeping, 2003 MICH. STATE L. REV. 987.
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effort made by manufacturers in producing a complex
technology product that provides overall safety and other
benefits. Alternatively, jurors could perceive autonomous
vehicles as a premature, and even reckless, foray that
deserves to be soundly punished and deterred.53 The latter
reaction may be even stronger in the context of a lawsuit over
an accident allegedly caused by an autonomous vehicle.
There is some evidence that lay persons composing a jury are
suspicious of unfamiliar and exotic-edge technologies,
regardless of their actual probability of causing harm.54 This
research could be a concern for manufacturers of all novel
high-tech
products,
including
autonomous
vehicles.
Moreover, a phenomenon called “betrayal aversion” finds that
people often have a strong emotional reaction against a safety
innovation that actually causes harm, even if the net effect of
the innovation is to improve safety.55 For example, the jury
verdict against GM for its C/K pickup case, involving an
award of over $100 million in punitive damages, suggests
that juries are prone to outrage against a high-tech
manufacturer because of the increased risk created by one
type of accident This result was reached even though the
overall crashworthiness of the vehicle was equivalent or
superior to most other vehicles on the road.56
IV. LEGAL AND POLICY PROTECTIONS
The above analysis suggests that liability may present a
serious barrier for the production and development of
autonomous vehicles, even if the products are socially
beneficial overall. The shift in liability from drivers to
manufacturers, notwithstanding the overall decrease in total
accidents (and liability), may deter manufacturers from

53. Beiker, supra note 21, at 1152 (“Overreaction [by juries] is a clear
danger . . . .”); Moore & Lu, supra note 1, at 5 (consumers will expect
autonomous vehicles to function as safely or safer than driver-controlled
vehicles).
54. Paul Slovic & Ellen Peters, Risk Perception and Effect, 15 C URRENT
DIRECTIONS IN P SYCHOL. S CI . 322 (2006); Yuval Rottenstreich & Ran Kivetz,
On Decision Making Without Likelihood Judgment, 101 ORGANIZATIONAL
B EHAV . & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 74 (2006).
55. Jonathan J. Koehler and Andrew D. Gershoff, Betrayal Aversion: When
Agents of Protection Become Agents of Harm, 90 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. &
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 244 (2003).
56. Id.
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developing autonomous vehicle technologies.57 Moreover,
while manufacturers may be able to transfer some of those
costs back to drivers through higher vehicle prices, the risk
discounting that consumers apply, in which they undervalue
products that reduce future risks, will prevent consumers
from investing in such products at a socially optimal level.58
There are some possible legal and policy tools that may
help protect manufacturers from liability. One such tool
within the litigation system is the assumption of risk defense.
Outside the litigation system, another tool is the pursuit of
legislation that provides immunity or other defenses to
manufacturers. Legislation could help minimize liability, or
alternatively, the National Highway Safety Traffic
Administration (“NHTSA”) could promulgate regulations that
expressly preempt state tort actions.
A. Assumption of Risk Defense
The assumption of risk defense provides that a product
user who knowingly accepts the risks of a potentially
hazardous product assumes some or all of the responsibility
for any harm that may befall them from use of the product.59
Such a defense requires that the product user understand
and willingly assume the risks.60 Thus, for such a defense to
apply to autonomous vehicles, the manufacturer would have
to fully disclose the potential risks of the vehicle, including
the likely failure modes and some approximate sense of their
probability. Such a defense would be stronger if the driver of
an autonomous vehicle signed a written waiver accepting the
risk of the vehicle. Even in these circumstances, however,
courts often refuse to recognize the defense. Assumption of
risk has been merged into the comparative negligence
analysis and is no longer recognized as a separate defense in
many states.
The recent Restatement (Third) of
Apportionment of Liability rejects a general non-contractual

57. AYERS, supra note 24, at 2.
58. Id. at 27–28.
59. Eric A. Feldman & Alison Stein, Assuming the Risk: Tort Law, Policy,
and Politics on the Slippery Slopes, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 259 (2010).
60. E.g., Murphy v. Steeplechase Amuse. Co., 166 N.E. 173, 174 (N.Y. 1929)
(holding that riders on an amusement ride assume the obvious risk of the
attraction); Chepkevich v. Hidden Valley Resort, L.P., 2 A.3d 1174, 1186 (Pa.
2010) (holding that a skier assumed risk of injury from ski lift).
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assumption of risk defense.61 Moreover, even if the defense
does apply, it would only extend to the owner and possibly
passengers of the autonomous vehicle, not to the occupants of
the other vehicle.
B. Legislative Protections
Another line of defense for autonomous vehicle
manufacturers would be legislation at either the federal or
state level that would protect against, or limit, liability.62 The
rationale for such legislative intervention would be supported
by the fact that autonomous vehicles represent a socially
beneficial technology that may be hindered by real or
perceived liability concerns.
Of course, providing such
legislative protection from liability has its downside—it
diminishes, if not eliminates, the incentives for
manufacturers to make marginal improvements in the safety
of their products in order to prevent liability. The net value
and hence wisdom of such legislative interventions will
therefore depend on how they are constructed and the
balance they strike between these positive and negative
incentives.
While it is relatively rare for legislatures to intervene to
protect specific technologies or products from liability, there
are some precedents regarding comparative technologies. At
the federal level, Congress adopted legislation severely
restricting the form and amount of liability that courts could
impose from Y2K-related problems.63 Similarly, Congress
enacted the Price-Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act
in 1957 to protect the nuclear industry from excessive
liability from nuclear accidents.64 The Oil Pollution Act of
61. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 2 cmt.
f (2000).
62. See Wallach, supra note 29, at 194, 196 (discussing incentives of
autonomous product manufacturers to seek legislation providing liability
protection); Calo, supra note 14, at 601–09 (proposing limited immunity from
liability for manufacturers of autonomous systems).
63. Year 2000 Responsibility and Readiness Act, Pub. Law No: 106-37
(1999) (limits Y2K liability in two ways: (a) by limiting it to proportional rather
than joint and several liability; and (b) by requiring clear and convincing
evidence of damage and limiting the amount of damages to the lesser of
$250,000 or three-times compensatory damages). Y2K refers to the potential
problems that were anticipated to result from computers failing to accurately
interpret the date when the calendar reached the year 2000.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2006).
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1990 created the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, which sets
caps on liability for oil spills.65 The Public Readiness and
Emergency Preparedness Act of 2005 provides drug makers
with immunity from liability for injuries caused by vaccines
during declared public health emergencies (e.g., avian flu
epidemic).66 The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act was
enacted in 1986 to limit liability for childhood vaccines, in
response to concerns that liability would force many suppliers
of such vaccines out of business.67 The General Aviation
Revitalization Act of 1994 immunized manufacturers of small
planes and small plane parts from liability for a period of
eighteen years in response to the potential for widespread
bankruptcy in that industry.68
At the state level, several legislatures have adopted laws
to limit liability in a number of different arenas. For
example, many states have adopted laws that cap allowable
damages in medical malpractice actions, largely in an effort
to encourage physicians to continue to practice medicine in
their states and to lower the overall cost of health care.69
Similarly, almost all states have taken the initiative to place
some limit on the amount of punitive damages that their
courts can award.70 These efforts illustrate states’ propensity
to ameliorate the liability concerns faced by vulnerable, but
promising, technologies like autonomous vehicles.
C. State Preemption
A third possible protection for manufacturers of
autonomous vehicles is federal preemption of state tort
actions. In particular, a Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard, (“FMVSS”) adopted by NHTSA, may preempt state
tort actions that are in conflict with the standard. There are

65. 33 U.S.C. § 2704 (2006).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 329 (2006).
67. 2 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1–300aa-4 (2006).
68. Pub. L. No. 103-298, § 2(a), 108 Stat. 1552 (1994) (codified at 49 U.S.C. §
40101 notes (2006) (cited in Calo, supra note 14, at 603 n.220).
69. FRED J. HELLINGER & WILLIAM E. ENCINOSA, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY: THE
IMPACT OF STATE LAWS LIMITING MALPRACTICE AWARDS ON THE GEOGRAPHIC
DISTRIBUTION OF PHYSICIANS 3 (2003), available at http://www.ahrq.gov/
research/tortcaps/tortcaps.htm.
70. Punitive Damages Reform, AMERICAN TORT REFORM ASSOCIATION,
http://www.atra.org/issues/punitive-damages-reform (last visited Apr. 20, 2012).
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two obstacles to this protection. First, NHTSA has not
adopted FMVSSs specific to autonomous vehicles. It is
conceivable, however, that the agency may adopt such
standards in the future if autonomous vehicles are likely to
become prevalent and raise unique safety issues. The second
obstacle is that most FMVSSs do not preempt state tort
actions.71 Courts have found preemption only in the narrow
context where the state tort action actually interferes with
the achievement of the objective of the federal standard.72 In
construing the federal government’s objective behind a
FMVSS, the courts looked at the regulation’s history,
NHTSA’s contemporaneous explanation of the regulation’s
purpose, and the agency’s current view of its preemptive
effect.73 Thus, if the agency so intended, NHTSA may be able
to write and explain future safety standards for autonomous
vehicles in a way that preempted some, or all, state tort
actions.74
CONCLUSION
Autonomous vehicles will increase the safety of vehicle
travel by reducing vehicle collisions. Ironically, autonomous
vehicles are likely to increase the liability exposure of vehicle
manufacturers.
Autonomous vehicles will shift the
responsibility for avoiding accidents from the driver to the
vehicle manufacturer. Although the autonomous vehicle is
expected to result in a net decrease in the number of
accidents, it will create new modes of failure that will be
attributed to the vehicle. These failures are likely to generate
lawsuits against the vehicle manufacturer and possibly
manufacturers of components of the autonomous system.
71. See, e.g., Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1131 (2011)
(holding that the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard, giving auto
manufacturers the choice of installing either simple lap belts or lap-andshoulder belts on rear inner seats, did not pre-empt state tort claims seeking to
impose liability on manufacturer for installing simple lap belts on the rear inner
seat of a minivan).
72. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (preempting
state tort action alleging the failure to install air bags when federal standard
only requires installation of air bags in some vehicles of the applicable model
year).
73. Id. at 875–85.
74. It may also be possible to address some of the liability concerns
discussed in this Article through innovative insurance policies, but such ideas
are discussed elsewhere in this symposium issue.
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Plaintiffs will target manufacturers because they will often be
most at fault for the malfunction that caused the accident and
they have the deepest pockets of all involved parties.
Manufacturers of autonomous vehicles are likely to argue
that their “fault” should be evaluated in a comparative
context, with credit given to the net safety benefits of the
autonomous vehicles. The history of such arguments made by
manufacturers of other, safer, products suggest that this
comparative or net risk assessment is unlikely to succeed. If
that prediction comes true, and if autonomous vehicles have a
significant rate of failure (likely in the initial years at least),
liability may be a barrier that blocks the introduction of this
socially beneficial new technology.
If this problem is serious enough, it may require greater
use of an assumption of risk defense, legislative liability
protection, or preemption, to ensure autonomous vehicles are
not unduly impeded by liability concerns. Of course, one
disadvantage of these approaches is that by immunizing the
internalization of accident costs from vehicle manufacturers,
they may reduce the pressure on manufacturers to make
incremental improvements in the safety of their autonomous
systems. Notwithstanding this limitation, it may be better to
have autonomous vehicles sooner rather than later even if
they are imperfect, given that even imperfect autonomous
vehicles will be safer than vehicles on the road today.

